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Massive Migration and Elections: Evidence from the 
 
Refugee Crisis in Greece1 
 








This paper explores whether the massive arrival of refugees at Greek islands 
has had an impact on natives' voting behavior. Our results show a positive 
and significant effect of refugees' presence on votes for the Greek extreme-
right party Golden Dawn. More precisely, we find that a 1% increase in the 
share of refugees is associated with an increase of 5% in the share of votes 
for Golden Dawn. This outcome is robust under different estimation 
methodologies and placebo regressions.  
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1 Introduction  
 
 
The political instability of the Middle East has prompted an unprecedented surge of 
refugees to Europe. According to a report of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees released in June 2015, the number of forcibly displaced people around 
the globe had reached a figure of 59.5 million (UNHCR 2015), constituting the largest 
number of refugees since WWII. Whereas refugees have historically sought refuge in 
developing countries because of geographical proximity, the recent turmoil in North 
Africa and the Middle East, alongside the continuing violence in Afghanistan, has 
sparked a massive increase in displacements toward the European Union, with the 
number of people applying for asylum reaching a record figure of 1.26 million in 2015 
(Eurostat 2016). 
Meanwhile, we have witnessed a rise in nationalist and anti-immigration parties in 
several European countries, including Austria (FPÖ), Belgium (Vlaams Belang), 
Finland (True Finns), France (Front National), Germany (Pegida and AfD), Sweden 
(Sweden Democrats), the United Kingdom (UKIP), and the country studied in this 
paper, Greece (Golden Dawn). While the rise in extreme-right parties is not a new 
phenomenon in Europe (Arzheimer 2009), the trend does seem to have accelerated 
in more recent years, as epitomized by the successful Brexit campaign. This, in turn, 
raises two related questions: (i) whether a massive refugee presence can affect the 
political choices of natives in European countries, and (ii) whether increases in right-
wing votes reflect anti-immigration feelings going beyond purely economic concerns. 
To address these questions, we explore the effect of the unprecedented surge of 
refugees to the European Union on two parliamentary electoral results in Greece in 
January and September 2015. Our focus on refugees in Greece contributes to the 
existing literature by allowing us to instrument the number of refugees with the 
geographical distance separating (recipient) Greek islands from (sending) Turkish 
coasts. We are thus able to clearly identify the positive effect of a massive increase 
in refugees on extreme-right votes. Moreover, our analysis reveals that this same 
surge of refugees has negatively affected right-wing parties, thus suggesting a 
transfer of right-wing voters toward more radical political platforms. Lastly, the high 
number of refugees, together with the short timespan separating the two electoral 
rounds, allows us to conclude that the aforementioned effects are likely to have been 
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driven by a potential rise in anti-immigration feelings or a protest for feeling 
abandoned by the Greek government of the Greek voters. To further rule out 
economic channels as the cause of the rise in political extremism, we conduct a 
placebo analysis. We substitute the voting share of Golden Dawn in the 2015 
election with that of 2012; given that this election took place before the large inflow of 
refugees, we should see no effect of the presence of refugees in 2012 on this earlier 
election. Indeed, we find no effect. 
 Immigration — especially in the presence of large numbers of migrants — has been 
shown to generate anti-immigration feelings (Hopkins 2010; Dustmann et al. 2011) 
and these feelings are expressed through voting for extreme-right parties or racist 
behavior (e.g., Knigge 1998; Norris 2005; Rydgren 2008; Halla et al. 2017). The 
channels explaining this phenomenon are multiple. Anti-immigration attitudes are 
explained by both economic factors, such as labor market competition and the impact 
of immigration on the fiscal burden, and non-economic factors rooted in cultural 
values and beliefs (see, for example, Rydgren 2008; Arzheimer 2009; Hainmueller 
and Hopkins 2014; Barone et al. 2016; Halla et al. 2017). 
Theories tying immigration to the labor market rely mostly on the Heckscher–Ohlin 
and the factor proportions models and emphasize the competition that native workers 
may be facing from migrants. The main conclusions are that under fairly general 
conditions the skilled (un-skilled) natives should be in favor of unskilled (skilled) 
migrants, while opposing skilled (unskilled) ones (Scheve and Slaughter 2001; 
Mayda 2006; O’Rourke and Sinnott 2006). The empirical support shows that low-
skilled immigration increases (decreases) negative attitudes toward migrants from 
low-skilled (high-skilled) natives (Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Mayda 2006; 
O’Rourke and Sinnott 2006; Facchini and Mayda 2009). The effect of migrants on 
labor markets goes beyond wage considerations, though, since higher 
unemployment rates have equally been shown to boost extreme-right parties 
(Jackman and Volpert 1996) or right-wing criminal activities (Falk et al. 2011). In the 
specific Greek context, Karydis (2004) presents survey evidence according to which 
anti-immigration feelings are rooted in the fear of migrants stealing jobs. On the other 
hand, there is evidence in Germany that the migrants do not displace the jobs of 
native workers but rather struggle to find jobs (Gehrsitz et al. 2017). The second 
economic channel — which has been shown to be quantitatively bigger than that of 
the labor market (Dustmann and Preston 2007) — operates via the increased fiscal 
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burden required to provide social security to the newcomers. Nevertheless, there is 
evidence that economic conditions are not the main reason for the support of 
extreme-right parties (see Labrianou and Ellinas 2016; Rydgren 2008; Ivarsflaten 
2005).  
Setting aside pure economic factors, natives’ attitudes toward economic migrants 
and refugees have equally been shown to be affected by anti-immigration feelings 
and perceived threats to one’s cultural identity (Mayda 2006; Arzheimer 2009). In the 
context of Sweden, for instance, Bauer et al. (2000) conclude that this dimension is 
more salient than economic factors, while Dustmann and Preston (2007) find that in 
Great Britain the cultural aspect is highly relevant in explaining negative attitudes 
toward migrants. In fact, cultural distance has been shown to matter (Mayda et al. 
2015). According to Mendez and Cutillas (2014), more culturally proximate migrants 
(e.g., Latin Americans in Spain) may translate into more votes for leftist parties, while 
culturally distant ones (e.g., Africans in Spain) increase votes for anti-immigration 
parties. Moreover, an experimental study of the Netherlands further confirms the 
salience of cultural distance being perceived as a threat to cultural identity 
(Sniderman et al. 2004). 
Two studies on the effect of immigration on Danish politics partially concur with a 
positive association with extreme-right-wing votes. Harmon (2014) uses historical 
renting housing stock to instrument the current settlements of migrants and finds that 
higher ethnic diversity in Danish municipalities increases the support for anti-
immigration (nationalist) parties at municipal elections, which parallels decreases in 
political support for left-wing parties. Using a different identification strategy that 
exploits the random assignment of migrants across municipalities, Dustmann et al. 
(2016) find that immigration boosts anti-immigration parties’ votes, except in the 
municipalities with a very high population density (e.g., urban centers), where the 
reverse holds true. Lastly, Steinmayr (2016) instruments the number of refugees in 
Austrian communities (an administrative unit of 3,000 inhabitants on average) with 
the existence of buildings suitable for hosting migrants. The study finds evidence in 
support of Allport’s (1954) contact hypothesis following which contact with minority 
groups reduces the prejudice of the majority group toward the former one. 
Accordingly, the presence of refugees in Austrian communities has reduced the 
support for the anti-immigrant extreme-right party Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ). 
Seen together, these studies reveal that migrants and refugees could have different 
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effects on natives’ attitudes, and/or that particular socioeconomic contexts could 
influence the result. 
Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways.  The particular context of our 
study enables us to identify the specific impact of mass immigration on policy 
opinions. On the one hand, existing studies relying on attitude surveys have 
unsatisfactorily coped with endogeneity issues. On the other hand, the literature 
relying on electoral results that instruments for the presence of migrants in different 
manners suffers from a deficiency underlined by Mayda (2006) and Arzheimer 
(2009): since voting decisions are jointly determined by individual attitudes toward 
migrants and by the strategic reaction of political entities (government and opposition 
parties), it is very difficult to disentangle these two effects. 
The peculiarity of our context is that we exploit two electoral rounds (January and 
September 2015), which were 8 months apart and where, more importantly, the 
second election was neither caused by the refugee wave nor anticipated by voters or 
political parties. Indeed, in July 2015 the newly elected government decided in the 
midst of negotiations with funding bodies (the European Union) to launch a 
referendum on whether or not to accept the terms of securing a bailout of the Greek 
economy. This unexpected decision resulted in a large majority opposing the terms 
of the agreement that the government would eventually accept in the 13th hour. The 
Greek government’s decision to overrule the referendum’s result provoked wide 
discontent, which eventually compelled the government to organize renewed 
parliamentary elections. Importantly, during the same period separating the two 
electoral rounds, Greece witnessed a vast refugee wave from the Middle East and 
Asia — via Turkey — as the conflict in Syria intensified and refugees took advantage 
of the summer so as to attempt to reach the Greek shores by sea. Combined, these 
events imply that the country experienced a sharp increase in refugees shortly before 
unforeseen elections took place in September 2015, enabling us to study the pure 
policy opinion effect of immigration. 
 Our results show a positive and significant effect of refugees' presence on votes for 
the Greek extreme-right party Golden Dawn. More precisely, we find that a 1% 
increase in the share of refugees is associated with an increase of 5% in the share of 
votes for Golden Dawn. To provide further evidence of this anti-immigration channel, 
we demonstrate the absence of any effect in a placebo analysis on Greek islands 
that received no migrants and that are geographically proximate to the migrant-
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hosting islands. This result reinforces our conclusion that the increased electoral 
outcomes of Golden Dawn resulted from the very presence of migrants, rather than 
from the associated economic consequences, which is in line with the political 
literature in which economic conditions are not the main reason for the support of 
extreme-right parties (see Labrianou and Ellinas 2016; Rydgren 2008; Ivarsflaten 
2005). 
Lastly, we inquire as to whether the rise in extreme-right-wing vote shares can be 
attributed to a radicalization of right-wing voters or to other channels. Our findings 
reveal that Golden Dawn benefited from a transfer of votes from other right-wing 
factions such as ANEL and New Democracy. Given that the ANEL party participated 
in government with SYRIZA, we infer that the refugee crisis might reinforce anti-
system votes of islanders feeling neglected by the Greek state, partially due to its 
failure to adequately address the crisis. This is in line with Labrianou and Ellinas 
(2016), who suggest that Golden Dawn draws not only economic and cultural but 
also protest/anti-system votes (e.g., Knigge 1998). Meanwhile, we find that New 
Democracy has suffered significant electoral losses because of the refugee crisis, as 
their political agenda is focused only on economic issues, neglecting the immigration 
agenda that she had in previous elections.  
To further convince the reader, we instrument the stock of refugees with the 
interaction of time with the minimal travel distance from each Greek municipality to 
the closest Turkish border. The validity of the instrument rests on two elements, 
namely the homogeneity of the overall stock of refugees (rather than their precise 
location), which occurred between the two electoral rounds under study, and the 
refugee’s likely strategy of minimizing the crossing route to Greek territory. 
Combined, these features enable us to improve upon the existing literature by 
proposing a convincing identification strategy. 
In the next section we review the current refugee crisis and explore the migratory 
paths from Turkey to Europe via Greece. Section 3 describes the empirical model 






2. The background  
 
2.1 The refugee crisis  
 
In 2015, more than 1 million refugees are estimated to have reached Europe 
(International Organization for Migration), mainly by sea (97%) and mostly transiting 
via the Turkish shores to the Greek islands (82%), before pursuing their journey 
through the Balkans toward Northern Europe (IOM 2015). This unprecedented wave 
of refugees to Europe is to be comprehended in the context of the ongoing Syrian 
civil war, which has resulted thus far in around 250,000 casualties and 12 million 
displaced persons, according to conservative UN estimates (UN 2015). As of April 
2016, Turkey was hosting close to 3 million registered refugees (UNHCR 2016), most 
of whom desired reaching Northern Europe. The typical journey is both perilous and 
onerous. Turkish, Greek, Kurdish or ―Balkan‖ smugglers — also known as kaçakçi — 
organize the crossing from the Turkish shores to the Greek islands for amounts that 
can commonly cost between 2,500 and 3,500 euros (Papadopoulou 2004; To Vima 
2015). The smuggling strategy is relatively straightforward: smugglers rely on 
informants so as to avoid patrols from coast guards and the navy, and if the boat 
loaded with migrants happens to be detected, some of the passengers are instructed 
to fall in the sea in order to compel the Greek authorities to initiate a search and 
rescue operation instead of pushing the illegal boat back to Turkish waters. This 
perilous journey seems to have been the predilection road for refugees to penetrate 
Europe since the Greek government constructed a 4-meter-tall fence along the 
Greek–Turkish land border so as to contain illegal migration. The total number of 
registered arrivals of refugees in 2015 reached a record figure of 856,723, with the 
bulk of the migrants being directed toward the Greek islands bordering Turkey, as 
can be seen in Figure 1. The islands which received refugees comprised Chios, 
Lesvos, Tilos, Crete, Symi, Kos, Leros, Kalymnos, Agathonisi, Samos, Samothraki, 
and Rhodes.  
Once on Greek soil, the unique way in which refugees pursue their route to Northern 
Europe is by processing their papers with local Greek authorities, before embarking 
on vessels heading to Athens’ port, Piraeus, or to the port of Kavala. This 
unprecedented wave of migrants has created a bottleneck on the Greek islands, 
wherein local authorities have struggled to screen and record the migrants, while 
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ferry companies have reached capacity constraints on board their vessels. Moreover, 
the Greek islands did not have the infrastructure to accommodate these people, 
given that the influx of refugees was quite low in previous years (see Figure 1). The 
combination of these features makes our study unique: firstly, this wave of refugees 
has translated into a permanent presence of refugees on the Greek islands during 
the timespan covered by this study and, secondly, natives have protested against 
government or potential government parties due to feeling abandoned by the Greek 
state, hence dismissing any economic motivation for voting in favor of an anti-
immigration party.  
 
Figure 1: Registered arrivals of refugees in Greece in 2015 (UNHCR), monthly 
number of refugees and municipality-level shares of refugees in the population 
received in 2014 and 2015. 
 
2.2 The rise of Golden Dawn 
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Greece is a parliamentary democracy. Its parliament’s 300 members are elected for 
a four-year term by a (reinforced) proportional system in which 250 members are 
elected by a proportional allocation of votes to all of the parties (accounting for at 
least 3% of the total votes), with the remaining 50 seats being allocated to the party 
receiving the largest share of votes. Historically, two rival factions have dominated 
Greek politics, but since the beginning of the subprime crisis, we have witnessed a 
dispersion of votes together with an increase in the number of parties in parliament. 
One of the new entrants has been the extreme-right-wing party Golden Dawn. The 
party was founded in 1980 initially as a magazine, and then acted as a political 
movement during the 1990s. His presence in the political scene was insignificant, 
securing less than 0.5% of the total votes at parliamentary elections. The party 
gained momentum in the midst of the economic crisis, scoring 7% at the June 2012 
parliamentary elections. In the January and September 2015 electoral rounds the 
party renewed its electoral success, with its scores reaching 6.3% and 7% 
respectively. Figure 2 presents the share of votes for Golden Dawn in the last two 
elections (January 2015 and September 2015) in all of the municipalities of Greece.  
Golden Dawn is known for its harsh discourse and actions against migrants, and its 
political platform is deeply anti-austerity, anti-European and anti-immigration. These 
features have convinced part of the Greek electorate, with the party obtaining more 
than 20% of the votes in some municipalities of Athens in the May 2012 
parliamentary elections. Given this clear and loud anti-immigration discourse, the 
ongoing refugee crisis is likely to have contributed to strengthening the party in 
municipalities harboring refugees. 
The unprecedented refugee wave to Greece in 2015 has disproportionally affected 
islands neighboring Turkey, thus constituting an ideal context in which to test the 
impact of refugees’ presence on votes for an anti-immigration party. Two 
parliamentary elections were organized in Greece in 2015, in January and in 
September. The peculiarity of the September elections lies in that they were totally 
unexpected, thus preventing political parties from strategically designing electoral 
campaigns in advance. Moreover, the second electoral round was organized at the 
end of the northern hemisphere’s summer period, a period of particularly intense 
refugee smuggling due to favorable weather conditions. Together, these facts imply 
that municipalities close to the Turkish border had been exposed to important 
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Figure 2: Share of votes for Golden Dawn in elections of January 2015 and 
September 2015. 
  
3. Empirical methodologies and data 
 
3.1. Empirical models  
 
We use two different specifications in our analysis. The first benchmark specification, 
which is to test our main hypothesis regarding whether the share of refugees in the 
Greek municipalities affects the share of votes for Golden Dawn, reads as: 
                          (1) 
where     is the share of votes received by Golden Dawn in municipality i and 
electoral round t (t = January or September 2015), and REFit is the share of refugees 
over the total population of municipality i in electoral round t. 
The coefficient of interest is   and it captures the effect of the presence of refugees in 
a given municipality on the percentage of votes that the Golden Dawn party received. 
To mitigate the possibility of an omitted variable bias, we introduce time-varying 
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covariates, Xrt, that include the log of unemployment rates and the log of crime rates 
(thefts), which concerns total unemployment and the crime level divided by the 
population at a regional level. Lastly, we further capture unobserved heterogeneity by 
including year   
3 and municipality fixed effects   , with the time-fixed effects 
capturing — amongst other things — the common economic shock affecting Greece 
during the January–September 2015 period. Then, we alternate our specification 
while following Steinmayr (2016) and we take the first difference of Eq. (1), which 
becomes:  
                       , (2) 
where the dependent variable would have been the change in the voting share for 
Golden Dawn and the explanatory variable of interest the change in the share of 
refugees. This specification gives us the possibility to investigate whether the slight 
increase from the January to September 2015 elections can be linked to the refugee 
inflow. To solve the reverse causality and measurement problems, we next propose 
an instrumental variable approach. 
 
3.2 Instrumental strategy  
 
Our strategy consists in instrumenting the share of the stock of refugees with the 
interaction between a time dummy and the geodesic distance between each 
municipality of destination (i) and the closest Turkish border (r). Identification comes 
from the time-varying effect of geographic distance on migration, reflecting gradual 
changes in transportation and communication costs. The exclusion restriction is that 
distance affects the refugee number, but no other characteristics are likely to affect 
the voting behavior. 
 
 3.3. Data 
  
This study draws upon a new panel dataset combining electoral outcomes at the 
municipality level in Greece, data on refugees’ arrivals, geographic data (distance 
from the Turkish coast), and crime and unemployment on a regional basis.  
                                                          
3
 The ―time‖/year dummy captures an electoral period (January or September) rather than a temporal 
dimension. 
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Our electoral data cover vote outcomes for all of the parties that participated in the 
last two Greek legislative elections between January 2015 and September 2015. Our 
sample includes all of the municipalities of Greece (325 municipalities).  
 Data for refugees have been collected from the United Nations’ archives for the 
years 2014 and 2015. While refugees’ data are available on a monthly basis at 
municipality level, we calculate the average stock of refugees in different time 
windows, i.e., one month, three months and four months, to compute the share of 
refugees over the total population of the municipality.  Two remarks are in order here. 
Firstly, the rationale for also considering wide windows of observation rather than the 
number of registered refugees on the day preceding the elections lies in the 
substantial temporal (day-by-day) variation in the number of refugees present on the 
islands. This high temporal variation in the number of refugees implies that a wider 
window of observation provides a more reliable measure of the actual exposure to 
refugees. Secondly, the unit of observation is the municipality, despite the existence 
of more disaggregated electoral data (electoral center level). We follow this strategy 
because it is impossible to identify the number of refugees at the more disaggregated 
geographical unit of observation.  The reason is that after setting foot on the Greek 
islands the refugees were not confined to reception centers located in specific 
geographical areas4 and could instead be located anywhere on the island, which 
corresponds to our geographical unit of aggregation: the municipality. We accordingly 
collected electoral data for each municipality from the Ministry of Interior for the 
January and September 2015 ballots. 
To construct the shares of refugees over the total population, we use data for the 
population of each municipality from 2014 to 2015. The data are taken from a Greek 
statistics service (ELSTAT). We use as control variables for our regressions 
unemployment and crime data. The unemployment and crime data are collected from 
ELSTAT and the Greek police at a regional level.  The crime data comprise the total 
number of robberies, drug arrests and burglaries divided by the population of each 
municipality.  
Given the unavailability of data for the specific months of interest, January and 
September 2015, we instead take the (yearly) 2014 and 2015 variables as proxies for 
                                                          
4 The first such center was inaugurated in October 2015, hence after the September 2015 
elections.  
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those covering the period preceding, respectively, the January and September 2015 
elections. To compute the travel distance from Turkey to Greek municipalities, we 
use geographical coordinates to calculate the minimal travel distance from each 
Greek municipality to the closest Turkish border. More specifically, whenever a land 
connection exists, we calculate the minimum travel distance to the nearest Greek–
Turkish land border5. For islands, on the other hand, we use the geodesic distance to 
the closest Turkish shore5. Table 1 illustrates the summary statistics for the main 
variables of our analysis6. 
 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
     
REF3month 0.008 0.067 0 0.97 
Monthly refuge stock     239 3,565 0 86,449 
REF4month 0.009 0.07 0 0.95 
REF1month 0.006 0.05 0 0.96 
Golden Dawn 0.066 0.023 0 0.171 
SYRIZA 0.363 0.074 0.139 0.788 
New Democracy 0.309 0.078 0.047 0.679 
Potami 0.049 0.03 0.006 0.43 
KKE 0.054 0.031 0 0.331 
ANEL 0.042 0.018 0 0.207 
Centrists 0.023 0.013 0 0.112 
Pasok 0.036 0.042 0 0.207 
ln(unemployment 
rate) -2.99 0.848 -4.67 -0.782 
ln(crime rate) -7.193 0.644 -8.041 -4.875 
     
                                                          





4.  Results  
 
4.1 Benchmark results  
 
Table 2 displays the baseline estimates. Columns 1 to 3 illustrate the results of Eq. 
(1). In each column the share of refugees is constructed using different time windows 
of the average stock of refugees (1 month, 3 months, 4 months). Furthermore, 
Columns 4 to 6 show the results estimating Eq. (2).  The majority of the regressions 
explain more than 91% of the variation in the observed percentage of votes received 
from Golden Dawn. This ensures a very good fit, given that migration rates are very 
heterogeneous across corridors. The magnitude of the coefficient of the share of 
refugees is relatively high: an increase of one percentage point in the share of 
refugees is associated with an increase of five percentage points on average for 
Golden Dawn at the elections. Moreover, the unemployment and crime rates are not 
significant at any significance level. Columns 4 to 6 show the equivalent results using 
the change in the share of votes for Golden Dawn and the change in the proportion 
of refugees instead of the vote shares and refugees as dependent and independent 
variables respectively. We find a positive and significant effect of the increase in the 
change of the percentage of refugees on the change of the share of votes that 
Golden Dawn received. The size of the coefficient in Columns 4 to 6 is very similar to 












Table 2: Benchmark results 
Notes: In all tables standard errors are clustered at the municipality level and the corresponding standard errors 
are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 



























       
REFinflow1month      0.057*** 
      (0.009) 
 ln(unemployment)    -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
    (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
 ln(crime)    0.006 0.005 0.005 
    (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
REFinflow3month     0.056***  
     (0.009)  
REFinflow1month    0.062***   
    (0.019)   
REF4month   0.059***    
   (0.013)    
ln(unemployment) 0.002 0.002 0.002    
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)    
ln(crime) 0.005 0.003 0.003    
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)    
REF3month  0.058***     
  (0.013)     
REF1month 0.063**      
 (0.027)      
       
Observations 650 650 650 325 325 325 
R-squared 0.957 0.959 0.959 0.103 0.142 0.143 
Municipality dummies Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes No No No 
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4.2 Robustness checks  
 
In Table 3, we explore the robustness of our results, introducing additional controls 
and alternating the main specification. Firstly, in Columns 1 and 2, we include a 
dummy which takes the value of 1 for municipalities which elected members of 
Golden Dawn in Greek Parliament (IGD) and zero when Golden Dawn was not 
elected in the elections of 2012. This variable captures unobserved factors favoring 
the extreme right prior to the massive 2015 inflow of refugees. We notice that the 
coefficient of interest remains stable throughout the specifications of Columns 1 and 
2.  
The IGD coefficient is positive and significant, thus reflecting a higher tendency to vote 
for the extreme right in municipalities where the party had a higher propensity to elect 
its members in Greek parliament.  In Columns 3 and 4, we exclude from our sample 
the municipalities that had elected members of Golden Dawn in the last 4 years, so 
as to ensure that the municipalities that regularly elected members of Golden Dawn 
in Greek Parliament do not drive our results. We notice that the point estimate for the 



















Table 3: Benchmark with additional controls 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Share of votes 
for Golden 
Dawn 






Share of votes 
for Golden 
Dawn 
     
REF3month  0.057***  0.048*** 
  (0.013)  (0.013) 
ln(unemployment) -0.002 -0.001 -0.008* -0.007 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
ln(crime) 0.006 0.005 0.009 0.007 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) 
REF1month 0.061**  0.050*  
 (0.027)  (0.027)  
IGD 0.023*** 0.023***   
 (0.005) (0.005)   
     
Observations 648 648 389 389 
R-squared 0.958 0.960 0.961 0.963 
Municipality dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: In all tables standard errors are clustered at the municipality level and the corresponding standard errors 














4.3       Source of the rise 
 
In this subsection, we examine the potential source of the rise in the share of votes 
for Golden Dawn. We substitute the dependent variable of Eq. (2) for the percentage 
of votes for the parties entered in September 2015 in Greek Parliament. The intuition 
is that if the change in the proportion of refugees negatively affects one of the parties 
being in government, then it will be an indication that the refugee crisis might 
reinforce anti-system votes of islanders feeling neglected by the Greek state. If we 
find evidence that other parties have experienced electoral loss, it should be for a 
political reason.  
Table 4 shows that only two parties have experienced electoral losses. The two 
parties belong to the right wing: ANEL and New Democracy. ANEL was a party in the 
government, so our first hypothesis is confirmed. This argument is in line with 
Labrianou and Ellinas (2016). The electoral losses that New Democracy experienced 
are based on the argument that the main priority of the campaign of the party was for 
economic reasons, providing less importance to the immigration issue. This 
argument could be true, given that in 2012 this party in government built a fence in 


















Table 4: Sources of the rise of Golden Dawn 
 
Notes: In all tables standard errors are clustered at the municipality level and the corresponding standard errors 


















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Variables Difference 

























of share of  
votes for 
PASOK 
        
REF1monthinflow -0.009 -0.126* 0.015 0.011 -0.005* 0.006 0.034 
 (0.064) (0.074) (0.021) (0.018) (0.003) (0.006) (0.048) 
 ln(unemployment) -0.022 0.026 -0.003 0.010* 0.007 -0.002 -0.012 
 (0.021) (0.016) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.010) 
 ln(crime) 0.016 -0.082*** 0.011 -0.010 0.000 -0.005 0.059*** 
 (0.023) (0.027) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.004) (0.017) 
        
Observations 325 325 325 325 325 325 325 
R-squared 0.920 0.941 0.898 0.973 0.856 0.924 0.881 
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4.4 Instrumental variable results  
 
Since our benchmark regression is likely to be plagued by endogeneity concerns, in 
Table 5 we present the instrumental variable approach results. Our instrument — the 
interaction of the distance of Greek municipalities to the closest Turkish border with 
year dummies — is conceptually satisfying the exclusion restriction. Moreover, our F-
statistic allows us to exclude weak instrument concerns, given that it is above 10 in 
all of the regressions. Columns 1 and 2 depict the second-stage results when 
considering the share of refugees using the average of the stock of refugees in one-
month and three-month windows respectively.  
Columns 3 and 4 show the IV estimates for the change in the share of votes for 
Golden Dawn. In these regressions, we instrument the change in the share of 
refugees over the total population with geo-distance. The regressions explain more 
than 60% of the variation in the observed percentage of votes received from Golden 
Dawn. All of the columns document that the impact of the presence of refugees on 
the percentage of votes for the extreme right is now much larger and highly 
significant, suggesting a substantial overall downward bias in the OLS estimates. 
This finding highlights the fact that among the sources of bias, those delivering 
attenuation — such as measurement error and/or reverse causality — are likely to 
play a major role. After instrumenting for the shares of refugees, we find that an 
increase of one percentage point of the immigrant shares entails an increase in the 
percentage of votes for Golden Dawn of 10 percentage points on average.
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Table 5: IV regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
















     
 ln(unemployment)   0.004 0.004 
   (0.002) (0.002) 
 ln(crime)   -0.004 -0.004 
   (0.004) (0.005) 
REFinflow3month    0.145*** 
    (0.037) 
REFinflow1month   0.219***  
   (0.066)  
ln(unemployment) 0.006** 0.006**   
 (0.002) (0.003)   
ln(crime) -0.006 -0.005   
 (0.004) (0.042)   
REF3month  0.147***   
  (0.037)   
REF1month 0.220***    
 (0.027)  
 
  
Observations 659 650 325 325 
R-squared 0.71 0.61 0.58 0.142 
Municipality 
dummies 
Yes Yes No No 
Year dummies 

















Notes: In all tables standard errors are clustered at the municipality level and the corresponding standard errors 






4.5 Placebo regressions  
 
The literature has attempted to identify the sources of a change in political attitudes 
following migration using different approaches. In this section we provide tentative 
evidence to establish that the mechanism lying behind our findings is not rooted in 
economic reasons. 
Table 6 illustrates a placebo test. In Columns 1, 2 and 3, we substitute the voting 
share of Golden Dawn in the 2015 election with that of 2012 in Eq. (1). In both 
election outcomes, Golden Dawn received almost a similar percentage in total for 
entering in Greek Parliament.  
This placebo test is important, given that the share of votes for Golden Dawn fell in 
January 2014 because some members of them were in prison and then were 
released after a few months7. As a result, it could be claimed that the number of 
votes fluctuated for this reason. Moreover, Golden Dawn is the only party which 
remained in Greek Parliament against the austerity measure.  
Given that Greek Parliament voted on an additional memorandum in August 2015, 
some voters might have preferred to protest by voting for Golden Dawn. We did not 
find any significant effect of the share of refugees over the total population on the 











                                                          
7
 Golden Dawn has been accused of criminal actions. As of today, the court has not decided whether these 




Table 6: Placebo regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Share of votes for Golden 
Dawn 
Share of votes for Golden 
Dawn 
Share of votes for Golden 
Dawn 
ln(unemployment) 0.034** 0.034** 0.060** 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) 
ln(crime) -0.054** -0.054** -0.012 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.007) 
REF3month  -0.029  
  (0.061)  
REF1month -0.040  -0.050 
 (0.081)  (0.091) 
    
Observations 650 650 650 
R-squared 0.590 0.590 0.650 
Municipality dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies 
F-test 
Yes Yes Yes 
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Notes: In all tables standard errors are clustered at the municipality level and the corresponding standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. In the 














5. Conclusions  
The existing literature on the political economy of migration has demonstrated that 
both legal and illegal migration generate anti-immigration attitudes for economic and 
emotional reasons. State-of-the-art research exploits quasi-natural experimental 
settings, as well as regression discontinuities, to study the effect of migration on 
political outcomes. Our study complements this strand of the literature by exploiting a 
unique setting that enables us to accurately evaluate the effect of refugees’ presence 
on extreme-right votes. 
In this study we exploit an unprecedented surge of refugees to the Greek islands 
during the summer of 2015, and show that the municipalities that were more exposed 
to the inflow of refugees experienced a high (and absolute) increase in the share of 
votes for the anti-immigration party Golden Dawn in the Greek parliamentary 
elections of September 2015.  
This unique context, which features unexpected elections at the height of the refugee 
crisis, allows us to isolate the effect of an increased level of anti-immigration feelings 
in response to a refugee presence. Given the timing of events, we can reasonably 
rule out political parties’ strategic reactions to the refugee inflow, as well as standard 
economic channels identified by scholars, and thereby suggest that anti-immigration 
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